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The national government of Colombia and the Farc guerrilla started a peace negotia-
tion in late 2012 to terminate a prolonged and devastating armed conflict. Up to date, 
they have advanced in three of the six main points of the negotiation agenda. While dif-
ferent State agencies have estimated the costs that an eventual post-conflict process en-
tails, the discussion on the sources to finance it is still on going. The Colombian Govern-
ment has not disclosed a definitive plan to finance the needs of a post-conflict scenario, 
but it has hinted that the resource rents generated by the extractive sector may be a key 
source of finance. This paper aims to contribute to the debate of how to finance an even-
tual peace-building process in Colombia, by discussing the challenges and opportunities 
of using non-renewable natural resource rents, particularly from royalties.
*   This paper was presented in the International Conference on Public Policy that took place in Milan, 
July 1-4, 2015. I wish to thank Diana Dajer for her sharp comments and suggestions. The usual 
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Resumen
El Gobierno Nacional de Colombia y la guerrilla de las Farc iniciaron a finales de 2012 
una negociación de paz para poner fin a un conflicto armado prolongado y devastador. 
Hasta la fecha, han avanzado en tres de los seis puntos principales de la agenda de nego-
ciación. Si bien los distintos organismos del Estado han estimado los costos que conll-
eva un eventual proceso de posconflicto, la discusión sobre las fuentes para financiar aún 
está en marcha. El gobierno colombiano no ha dado a conocer un plan definitivo para 
financiar las necesidades de un escenario posconflicto, pero se ha dado a entender que las 
rentas de los recursos generados por el sector extractivo pueden ser una importante fuente 
de financiación. Este trabajo pretende contribuir al debate de cómo financiar un eventual 
proceso de consolidación de la paz en Colombia, al discutir los retos y oportunidades de 
la utilización de las rentas de recursos naturales no renovables, en particular de las regalías. 
Palabras clave: gasto público, justicia transicional, proceso de posconflicto, regalías, 
rentas de los recursos, sector extractivo.
1. Introduction
After a prolonged and devastating armed conflict, Colombia is currently seeking to 
terminate it through negotiation. A peace process between the national government and 
the Farc guerrilla1 started by the end of 2012 and advanced in three of the six main points 
of the negotiation agenda: rural development, political and citizen participation, and il-
legal drug trafficking. Three arduous points are still under negotiation: i) victims; ii) dis-
armament, demobilization and reinsertion (DDR); and, iii) conditions for the counter-
signature, implementation and verification of the agreements.
This is a crucial moment to devise how Colombia may manage the post-conflict, par-
ticularly how to finance it. An eventual post-conflict process in Colombia would entail a 
myriad of challenges and opportunities that require well planned and implemented poli-
cies.2 Among them, tackling how to finance these policies and programmes is one of the 
1 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, in Spanish Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). 
2 It could be argued that some features of a post-conflict scenario may have already started in Colombia, such as 
the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms (Justice and Peace Law in 2005 and Victim’s Law of 2011). 
Moreover, a 2012 national survey suggested that processes of reconciliation between victims and perpetrators had 
already started in Colombia (Rettberg, 2014, p. 252). However, the Colombian armed conflict has not terminated 
and produces victims on a daily basis. Moreover, most of the conflict’s victims are still waiting for the restitution of 
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biggest difficulties that the Colombian society must face. While the State has relatively 
good data to approximate the cost of such interventions, government officials have not 
been very assertive on how to finance peace-building policies. 
In September 2014, when the national budget for 2015 was being discussed in Con-
gress, President Santos informed that the government was evaluating different possibili-
ties to finance the “costs of peace”, which included the possibility of creating new taxes.3 
Moreover, in October 2014 the Minister of Finance announced that the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to setup a task force to assess different sources of finance.4 
More recently, the High Commissioner of Peace, Sergio Jaramillo, argued that the private 
sector should have a pivotal role in future peace-building, but that the economic burden 
could not be carried solely by companies.5 
Even though the Government has not yet disclosed a definitive plan to finance an 
eventual post-conflict, it seems that non-renewable resource rents may play an important 
role in its funding. Indeed, policy documents6 and frequent public interventions by Presi-
dent Juan Manuel Santos7 have pointed at the oil, gas and mineral companies as a pivotal 
sector to finance a post-conflict scenario. 
Colombia is relatively resource-rich and has relied on non-renewable resources for ex-
porting in the last decades.8 Moreover, as explained in section 3 of this paper, a significant 
share of the national government and the subnational governments’ income is derived 
from taxes, dividends9 and royalties10 paid by the extractive sector.
their land, other forms of economic reparation, and the installment of a system that guarantees their rights to truth 
and justice (DNP 2014b). Hence, in this article I will assume that the post-conflict may eventually start if peace 
negotiations are successfully closed.
3 See: “Financiamiento de la paz en debate”, published by Portafolio on September 10, 2014. Retrieved on 01/06/2015: 
http://www.portafolio.co/economia/financiamiento-paz-colombia-septiembre-2014. 
4 See “IMF to study how to finance peace in Colombia”, published by Colombia Reports on October 14, 2014. Retrieved 
on 11/06/2015:  http://colombiareports.com/imf-explore-mechanisms-financing-peace-agreement/.
5 See, for example: “’Hay que coger el toro por los cuernos’: Comisionado de Paz”, published by El Espectador on April 
22, 2015. Retrieved on 10/06/2015:  http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/hay-coger-el-toro-los-cuernos-
comisionado-de-paz-articulo-556552. 
6 Such as CONPES document Nº 3712 of 2011. 
7 See, for example, Bermúdez (2015).
8 The weight of hydrocarbons’ exports in the total national exports was above 25% during almost all the 2000s and 
reached a peak of 49% in 2011 (Bonet and Urrego, 2014). In 2014, oil exports represented 52.4% of total exports 
(MHCP, 2015, p. 11). Moreover, almost a third of the foreign direct investment in 2014 was destined for the 
hydrocarbon’s sector (MHCP, 2015, p. 11). The IMF (2007) defines a country as resource-abundant when its non-
renewable resource revenues represent 25% or more of its total fiscal revenues and/or if its non-renewable exports are 
equal or exceeds 25% of the total exports. 
9 Dividends transferred by Colombia’s state-owned oil company, Ecopetrol.
10 Companies or individuals pay royalties to the Colombian State in exchange for the right of extracting minerals and 
hydrocarbons (Article 360 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991). As it will be explained in the third section 
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This paper aims to contribute to the debate of how to finance an eventual post-conflict 
process in Colombia, by discussing the risks and opportunities of using non-renewable 
natural resource rents, particularly from royalties. To do so, the paper is divided in five 
sections, including this brief introduction. The second section explains the context of the 
armed conflict and the costs that the State may face in a post-conflict scenario. The third 
segment presents the context of the Colombian public finances and focuses on the system 
for the management of revenues from royalties. Subsequently, the fourth section balances 
the challenges and the opportunities of using non-renewable natural resources to finance 
a post-conflict scenario in Colombia, and the last one summarizes the conclusions of the 
paper. Finally, the conclusion section outlines some alternatives to avoid over-reliance on 
resource rents and suggestions to avoid the problems related to the use of royalties to fi-
nance post-conflict programmes.
This document does not aim to cover the broader discussion of the extractive sector 
in the Colombian post-conflict, nor the socio-economic and environmental challenges 
that financing development projects with resource revenues entails (Arisi and González, 
2014). These issues are very important, but go beyond the scope of this paper. 
2.  The context: the conflict and the post-conflict’s costs
Over a period of 50 years the Colombian armed conflict has produced more than 
seven million victims, around 15 per cent of the country’s inhabitants (MHCP, 2015, 
p. 89). Furthermore, the Colombian State estimated that until 2011 the armed conflict 
generated 830,000 “victimization acts”: almost three quarters of them included forced 
displacement and the rest involved homicide11, forced disappearance, kidnap, torture, 
recruitment of children, physical injuries, and sexual abuse.12 In terms of the amount of 
people that State has planned to treat, this is the biggest reparation program in the World 
(MHCP, 2015, p. 89).
Based on the Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011, the Colombian State 
calculated that the cost of repairing the conflict’s victims between 2012-2021 amounts 
to USD $ 21 billion (COP $ 54,903 billion).13 The projected costs of implementing the 
of this paper, royalties are collected by the National Government and almost entirely transferred to municipal and 
departmental governments. 
11 According to the Colombian National Centre for Historic Memory, between the years 1985–2013, at least 220,000 
died due to armed violence (81.5% of them non combatants) and 4,744,046 people were displaced due to the armed 
conflict (Arias et al., 2014, pp. 25-26). 
12 See, CONPES document Nº 3712 of 2011 and CONPES document Nº 3726 of 2012.
13 The right to remedy was calculated with the standards established by the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 
1448 of 2011). The costs included five types of expenditures: i) assistance (e.g. education, health, legal advisory, ID 
expedition); ii) attention (e.g. humanitarian aid, food supply, accommodation, resettlement, attention centres); iii) 
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individual and collective reparation programmes in these 10 years are equivalent to almost 
6% of GDP in 2014. Moreover, the expenditures projected solely for 2015 amount to 
1.2% of GDP in 2014 (MHCP, 2015, p. 89). 
Even if these costs were accurately calculated, the public expenditures that the Colom-
bian post-conflict scenario requires are bigger.14 Besides direct victims, the conflict also 
affected people that lived in conflict areas, especially children. For example, people that 
lived in conflict areas tended to receive less and lower quality education and health ser-
vices; furthermore, children were more prone to be affected by specific health problems 
(Arias, Camacho, Ibáñez, Mejía and Rodríguez, 2014). Moreover, the conflict reduced 
the productivity of agricultural activities, decreased private investment and weakened the 
state’s capacity (Arias et al., 2014). In this vein, the National Development Plan for the 
years 2014-2018, that adopted “peace” as one of its three main pillars, and acknowledged 
that the post-conflict requires making structural changes to “consolidate peace and open 
the doors of modernity for the country” (DNP, 2014b, p. 4).15 
In addition to repairing victims and reconstructing the shattered infrastructure, it is 
necessary to restore the “constructive and productive social relations among all members 
of the society” (Retteberg, 2014, p. 221). Therefore, the costs of reconciliation (“re-build-
ing trust among citizens and with state institutions”) must also be taken into account for 
post-conflict scenario (Rettberg, 2014, p. 221).16 
reparation (e.g. land-restitution, housing-restitution, housing subsidies, administrative indemnification, employment 
and income generation, debt assistance, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition); iv) strengthening the state 
agencies in-charge of implementing the Victims’s Law); and v) other costs (e.g. additional state building costs, 
collective indemnification to ethnic groups). 
14 The initial calculations of repairing the victims of the armed conflict in Colombia were much larger. Almost a decade 
ago, Richards (2006) quantified the financial resources required to repair the victims of the Colombian conflict in 
accordance with the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975 of 2005). The law established transitional justice mechanisms 
to incentive the demobilization and reintegration of “illegal armed groups”, covering both guerilla and paramilitary 
members. The law included a judicial procedure that allowed victims to request full compensation for the damage 
caused by the conflict. Richards (2006, p. 3) estimated that the costs of repairing all people directly damaged by 
the conflict between 1964 and 2005 was equivalent to a value between 19% and 33% of GDP of 2005. The lower 
financial cost of repairing victims under the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448 of 2011) is a consequence 
of two issues. First, this law limits the reparation to those damages caused after the year 1985, in spite that the conflict 
started at least two decades before. Second, the law gives the victims the option of obtaining limited administrative 
reparation if they accept to withdraw or refrain from starting judicial claims for full indemnification. 
15 Three objectives are derived from the peace pillar: i) to strengthen the conditions for a peace-building process and 
guarantee its sustainability (e.g. promoting citizen participation); ii) to integrate the territory and its communities (e.g. 
improve transport infrastructure and public utilities) and; iii) to reduce the social and territorial inequalities between 
the rural and urban municipalities.
16 However, a recent national survey of urban inhabitants suggests that the process of “reconciliation” has already started 
and that due the characteristics of the Colombian conflict its costs are note particularly high (Rettberg, 2014).
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In sum, re-constructing the human, social and physical capital shattered by the 
conflict implies a huge investment for Colombia. But post-conflict entails more needs 
than the ones explained above. This is the case of the implementation of DDR policies 
that will also require a considerable effort from the Colombian State. Due to previous 
experience with individual and collective demobilization of guerrilla and paramilitary 
combatants it is possible to estimate the cost of implementing a DDR programme in 
an eventual post-conflict process. A recent report by the General Comptroller’s Of-
fice on the implementation of DDR policies found that between 2003 and the first 
semester of 2014 a total of 56,939 people had demobilized and that 30,203 of them 
were still being treated by the Colombian Reintegration Agency (CGR, 2014, p. 18). 
Moreover, the General Comptroller’s Office found that between 2010 and the first se-
mester of 2014 the implementation of the DDR policies costed a total of USD $ 255 
million (CGR, 2014, p. 34). Based on these figures, the General Comptroller’s Office 
concluded that an eventual DDR programme for Farc guerrilla members would cost 
between USD $ 754 million and US $1.1 billion (equivalent to 0,2% to 0,3% of GDP 
in 2014, respectively).17 
However, using previous experience with DDR programmes to predict the cost of 
future DDR implementation for Farc has limitations. As pointed out by Schulhofer-
Wohl and Sambanis (2010), DDR programmes are quite heterogeneous across coun-
tries and even within-programmes. These programmes may vary from one another on 
different aspects, such as the entities in charge of implementation, the programming of 
different phases of intervention, degree of government participation in their administra-
tion and funding, the financial resources of the programme, and its comprehensiveness 
(Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 37). Hence, it may be the case that the initial 
calculations of the General Comptroller’s Office, based on previous DDR programmes, 
underestimate the costs of future DDR implementation in Colombia. 
The importance of the effectiveness of the DDR policies for preventing the re-initi-
ation of the armed conflict or the generation of new sources of violence related to orga-
nized crime cannot be overstated. Villa, Restrepo and Moscoso (2014) warn that if the 
Colombian economy is not capable of absorbing the demobilized combatants (and part 
of the Colombian army), the country may face the so-called “peace paradox”: the end of 
the armed conflict, but a subsequent increase in criminal activities. According to them, 
“an increase of delinquent activity may appear in the country, if the comparative advan-
tage of ex-combatants in the use of fire weapons allows them to enter the delinquent sec-
tor more easily” (2014: 206). Unfortunately, the experience with the demobilization of 
paramilitary groups in the last decade shows that this scenario is likely. 
Finally, the implementation of the Havana agreements between the National Govern-
ment and Farc will also require substantive investment of resources. The documents of 
17  Currently, Farc has between 8,000 to 10,000 combatants (Arias et al., 2014, p. 23). 
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the three agreements on an “integral rural reform”, “the solution to the problem of illegal 
drugs”, and “opening political participation” do not quantify the costs of implementa-
tion. Yet, the ambitious policies and interventions proposed in the agreements indicate 
that its implementation would entail a significant financial effort by the State, both at the 
national and local levels.18 
In sum, the finalization of the armed conflict will bring significant financial costs for 
the Colombian society and the State. Which sources of financing are available for that 
purpose? This topic is discussed in the next section. Nevertheless, before revising Co-
lombia’s public finances, it is pertinent to note that peace may also render monetary and 
non-monetary benefits. Different studies since the late 1990s and until recent times have 
attempted to estimate the economic and social costs of the conflict. 
There is consensus on the negative impact of the conflict on economic growth but the 
conclusions on the size of the impact vary. The calculations of the negative effect in terms 
of annual GDP (gross domestic product) growth fluctuate between 0.3 to 4.5 percentage 
points (Arias et al., 2014, p. 26).19 A very recent work by Villa, Restrepo and Moscoso 
(2014) aimed at estimating the so-called “peace dividend”, the economic benefits that 
can be derived through the end of the conflict through a negotiated process. According 
to their econometric estimation, if the armed conflict were reduced to a 100%, ceteris 
paribus, the departments’ annual GDP growth would increase on average 4.4 percentage 
points (Villa, Restrepo and Moscoso, 2014, p. 206).
3.  Colombian public finances
To frame the discussion on the possible sources of funds to finance the post-conflict 
and the government entities that could be in charge of executing these funds, this sec-
tion presents an overview of the Colombian public finances. Hence, this section starts 
by briefly presenting the decentralized structure of the Colombian State and the type of 
responsibilities that different levels of government have. Subsequently the paper portrays 
the public finances of the national and subnational governments. Finally, the section ex-
plains how the fiscal revenues from the royalties paid by the extractive sector are managed 
in Colombia after the 2011 constitutional reform.
18 For example, the agreement on the “integral rural reform” proposes, among others, the creation of a Land Fund to 
redistribute land and specific investments in infrastructure, social development, and support for farmers associations. 
Villar and Forero (2014), cited by OECD (2015, p. 18), calculate that the implementation of the peace agreement in 
the agricultural sector would require additional expenditures “of around 1% of GDP per annum for 2015-18”.
19 For a succinct account of the findings of different studies on the costs of the Colombian armed conflict, see also the 
speech of the former IMF’s Deputy Managing Director, E. Aninat, titled “The Economic Foundations of Peace in 
Colombia” delivered in Washington DC, on June 20, 2002.
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3.1  Unitary and decentralized State
Colombia is a unitary state with a system of three-tier governments: national, depart-
ment (32) and municipal (1102). Although Colombia’s decentralization process may be 
traced back to the end of the 1960s, it was only until the enactment of the 1991 Consti-
tution that political and fiscal decentralization was deepened (Dillinger and Webb, 1999; 
Zapata, 2010; OECD, 2014; CEECT, 2015).20 Nowadays the mayors of cities, the gov-
ernors of departments and the local and regional councils are elected through popular 
vote and sub-national governments receive substantial resources from the central govern-
ment.21 Due to the high level of resources transferred to subnational governments and 
their fiscal and political autonomy, Zapata (2010) has argued that Colombia is closer to 
a federal fiscal level. Additionally, local governments currently manage 70% of public in-
vestment in Colombia (OECD, 2014, p. 114).22 
Furthermore, the political and fiscal decentralization is coupled with diverse account-
abilities in regards to service delivery and provision of public goods. More specifically, 
since 1986, municipalities have responsibilities on the provision of education, health, 
water, sewage and sanitation services and infrastructure such as urban transport facilities 
and tertiary roads (Dillinger and Webb, 1999). Yet, the allocation of competences in Co-
lombia is complex, and municipalities share some of the listed functions with the national 
government and with departments’ governorates (OECD, 2014). 
Decentralization is not just about tax sharing or the assignment of funds to subnation-
al governments, but also about expenditure autonomy (Dillinger and Webb, 1999). The 
autonomy to spend of local governments in Colombia is relative due to the prevalence of 
earmarked national transfers and low own-source generation.23 Indeed, Colombia is one 
20 The economic decentralization came first in 1968, with the amendments to the 1886 constitution, when municipalities 
and departments were assigned fixed sums of national revenues and shares of national taxes to spend in health and 
education (Dillinger and Webb, 1999). In the following years the economic decentralization was strengthened, but 
political decentralization did not come into play until the mid-80s. The first election of city and municipal mayors 
took place in 1988 after a legal reform in 1986. The political decentralization was coupled with more functions and 
funds to municipalities (Dillinger and Webb, 1999). 
21 Around thirty percent of the Colombian national revenues are transferred from the national government to the 
municipal and department governments, a high percentage by international standards (Zapata, 2010; OECD, 2015, 
p. 22). Most local governments depend on national transfers since they do not raise sufficient own-source funds. In 
2013, on average, less than 40% of municipal budget’s came from local taxes and  less than 22% of department’s 
budgets were levied locally (DNP, 2014a). Furthermore, 41 municipalities (out of 1098) raised 80% of municipalities’ 
own funds and 6 departments (out of 32) raised 70% of departments’ own funds (DNP, 2014a). Additionally, the city 
of Bogotá accrues 35% of the total local revenues collected by municipalities in Colombia (CEECT, 2015, p. 38).
22  In contrast, in 2014 around 81% of the central government’s budget was destined to current expenditures, while only 
19% was used for capital expenditures (IMF, 2015, p. 45).
23 The Constitution and laws earmark most of the resources provided by the national government to subnational 
governments. However, according to Dillinger and Webb (1999) the strings attached to the resources, in the case of 
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of Latin America’s countries with the largest percentage of earmarked public spending 
(Cárdenas, Mejía and Olivera, 2009, p. 107). 
This feature is key for the discussion of how the post-conflict policies may be financed 
and may partially explain why the national government has considered the resource rev-
enues system to circumvent Colombia’s fiscal rigidity. Indeed, the 2011 royalties’ reform 
allowed almost all departments and municipalities to access funds that are not earmarked 
by the law. The royalties may be used to fund local capital investments in the sectors that 
local governments consider more pertinent for the development of their regions. In this 
sense, the 2011 reform increased the autonomy of mayors and governors to decide where 
to invest local public investments. 
3.2   National government finances
In 2014, 86% of the national government income came from taxation and around 
12% from capital resources (such as the dividends paid by state-owned oil company, Eco-
petrol) (MHCP, 2015, p. 56). From the total tax revenues received by the national gov-
ernment in 2014, 46% corresponded to income taxes, 26% to value-added taxes, 15% 
foreign-sourced taxes (e.g. duties), and 13% other taxes (such as a wealth tax) (MHCP, 
2015, p. 58). The Ministry of Finance projected that the national government’s fiscal defi-
cit would grow in for 2015, amounting to 3.0% of GDP (0.6 percentage points above 
2014), due to the reduction on oil-related revenues and the lower growth of the economy 
(MHCP, 2015, p. 54). 
Despite that the national government claims that Colombia’s economy is not depen-
dent on hydrocarbons, the first issue discussed in the Ministry of Finance’s Medium-
Term Fiscal Framework 2015-2018 (MTEF) was the plummeting prices of oil (MHCP, 
2015, p. 11).24 Oil prices are currently 40% below the market prices in June 2014 and 
the Ministry of Finance recognized that the main challenges posed by this situation are 
fiscal (MHCP, 2015, p. 14). Resource rents are a significant source of income for the na-
tional and subnational governments in Colombia. These rents include income taxes paid 
by extractive firms, dividends transferred by Ecopetrol and royalties paid by oil and min-
ing companies.25 
municipalities, have not been restrictive in practice due to the flexible interpretation given to local governments to the 
conditions established by the laws. 
24 The optimism of the Ministry of Finance it is also reflected on the fact that the MTEF 2015-2018 assumes that the 
prices of oil will recover significantly and that Colombian crude production will grow, despite different structural 
conditions that make both assumptions unlikely. See OECD (2015), Kalmanovitz (2015) and Ahumada (2015). 
25 The weight of resource revenues in Colombian public finances grew in the last quarter of the century. During the 
period 1990-2003 the fiscal income from mining and hydrocarbons activities in Colombia represented on average 
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In the last three years, the rents derived from income taxes paid by hydrocarbons com-
panies plus the dividends paid by Ecopetrol represented, on average, 17% of the national 
government’s income (MHCP, 2015, p. 13).26 Moreover, revenues from royalties, mostly 
destined for subnational governments, were equivalent to 1.4% of Colombia’s GDP in 
2012 (OECD, 2014, p. 95).27 Additionally, a significant number of subnational govern-
ments are resource-dependent.28 Indeed, in 151 municipalities royalties represented more 
than 25% of total capital investment income and in 51 municipalities royalties accounted 
for more than 50% of total capital investment income.29 
To curb the fiscal deficit, the government decided to postpone expenditures in 2015 
equivalent to 0.7% of GDP (0,4% associated with investment) (MHCP, 2015, p. 55). 
Furthermore, in December 2014 Congress approved a tax reform “designed as a short-
term tool to offset scheduled revenue declines” (IMF, 2015, pp. 2). However, these ef-
forts fell short in regards to the fiscal needs of the Colombian State.30 Besides improving 
tax management and curbing evasion, Colombia needs to find additional resources to 
fund future social programmes and to shorten the country’s infrastructure gap (CEECT, 
2015; IMF, 2015; MHCP, 2015; OECD, 2015). In this vein, the OECD very recently 
suggested that it was critical for Colombia to raise “revenues in an efficient and fair way” 
and recommended to “[u]ndertake a comprehensive reform of the tax system to increase 
fairness, growth and revenues” (2015, pp. 6, 18). 
11.3% of the total fiscal income of the country, while in the period 2004-2009 they represented on average 16.3% of 
the total fiscal income (Altomonte et al., 2013, pp. 33 and 62).
26 Moreover, in 2013 11.2% of the central government’s total revenues (equivalent to 1.9% of GDP) came from 
Ecopetrol’s dividends (OECD, 2015, p. 17). In recent years, the sum of Ecopetrol’s dividends transferred to the 
national government and income taxes amounted to 15% of national income (CEECT, 2015, p. 17). 
27 The weight of royalties paid by extractive companies to the Colombian State grew in the last decade. In 2002, these 
revenues represented 0,6% of the country’s gross domestic product in 2002 (Bonet and Urrego, 2014, p. 1). 
28 In 2013, royalties represented a sum that was equivalent to approximately 86% of all the local taxes levied at the 
department level (DNP, 2014a, pp. 56-57). At the municipal level, the royalty funds represented a sum that was 
equivalent to approximately 28% of the income derived from local taxes levied by municipalities (DNP, 2014a, pp. 
64-65). Finally, in 2013 royalties represented on average 8% and 25% of the total income of municipalities and 
departments, respectively (DNP, 2014a, pp. 56, 64).
29 Colombia has a total of 1,102 municipalities. Calculations based on data from DNP (2014a).
30 A recent report by OECD (2015, p. 17) argued: “Colombia has important spending needs. Public infrastructure 
investment will be critical to economic development and is expected to rise after 2020. Indeed, currently planned 
infrastructure investment may prove insufficient to address bottlenecks in transportation and energy (Clavijo, Vera and 
Vera, 2013a). Spending pressures also arise from already planned expansions of social policies and a potential peace 
deal with armed groups. For example, expanding non-contributory pensions, increasing the quality of education and 
the coverage of early childcare programmes, and planned additional health care expenditures would cost around 1.7% 
of GDP.”
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In February of 2015 the national government established an expert commission to 
find ways for mobilizing additional revenue (IMF, 2015).31 The first report presented by 
the commission after three months of work consisted on a diagnostic of the Colombian 
tax system’s problems. The commission concluded that despite of Colombia’s high nomi-
nal tax rates, in comparison with international standards, it has one of the lowest tax col-
lection rates (CEECT, 2015, p. 13). Besides concluding that Colombia’s tax system does 
not generate sufficient income, the commission also concluded that the system is not pro-
gressive and that it is inefficient (CEECT, 2015).
Bearing in mind the adverse fiscal situation of the Colombia State it is quite out-
standing that the national government increased in 4,3% (real terms) the budget for 
the victim’s programmes between 2014 and 2015 (MHCP, 2015, p. 89). Moreover, 
besides the specific reparation programmes, the national government has also aimed 
at targeting its public expenditures to the victims population, which will represent in 
2015 approximately 7% of the total national government expenditures (MHCP, 2015, 
p. 89). Additionally, the investment in “social inclusion and reconciliation”32 will ac-
count for 22% of national government total capital expenditures in 2015 (MHCP, 
2015, p. 61). The latter is consistent with the MTEF 2015-2018,33 which contains the 
expenditure projections, both current and capital, for each sector that is part of the 
national budget. Indeed, the first objective mentioned in this MTEF is the necessity 
to maintain the social expenditures related to the implementation of the Victims and 
Land Restitution Law (1448). 
Nevertheless, aside from the latter, neither the MTEF 2015-2018 nor the approved 
2015 national budget include explicit and significant provisions for future implementa-
tion of post-conflict programmes. The fact that the 2015 national budget did not include 
specific provisions for post-conflict did not pass unnoticed and Congress members, from 
government and opposition parties, criticized that shortcoming.34
31 The Commission of Experts for Fiscal Equity and Competitiveness was setup by the national government through the 
Decree Nº 327 of February 25, 2015. 
32 Includes financing the programme for early childhood, Familias en Acción (conditional cash transfer programme), and 
other programmes for low income, vulnerable, displaced and victims population.
33 The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is prepared in a yearly basis by the Ministry of Finance and the 
National Planning Unit (DNP). The MTEF is the main input used by the National Government for the formulation 
of the annual national budget. In the case of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 2015-2018, it was approved 
in document CONPES Nº 3813 of 2014. 
34 See, for example: “Financiamiento de la paz en debate”, published by Portafolio on September 10, 2014. Retrieved on 
01/06/2015:  http://www.portafolio.co/economia/financiamiento-paz-colombia-septiembre-2014. 
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3.3  Local government finances and the management of revenues from royalties
The three main sources of subnational governments’ income in Colombia are inter-
governmental transfers, revenues from royalty payments, and local taxes.35 Local gov-
ernments are dependent on the first two types of income: in 2013 inter-governmental 
transfers represented almost half of local governments’ income and royalties represented 
8% and 25% of the total income of municipalities and departments, respectively (DNP, 
2014, pp. 56, 64).36 
The essential difference between inter-governmental transfers and non-renewable re-
source rents is their destination. On one hand, inter-governmental transfers from the 
national government to the local governments have strings attached. Indeed, 80% of 
the intergovernmental transfers are earmarked for health and education (OECD, 2014, 
p. 195).37 On the other hand, the current royalty system gives local governments more 
autonomy to decide how to invest the resource rents they access.38 These resources are 
not earmarked but may be invested by local governments in their preferred sectors (e.g. 
transport, housing, education, etc.), as long as they formulate investment projects that are 
approved by multi-tier government directorates. Let us revise how resource revenues are 
currently managed in Colombia.
Colombia’s 1991 Constitution established that the exploitation of non-renewable nat-
ural resources generate an obligation to pay a royalty in favour of the State.39 The origi-
nal rule of the 1991 Constitution mandated that royalties had to be distributed mainly 
among the municipalities and departments where such exploitation took place or where 
35 While local governments’ expenditures accounted in 2011 for 33.2% of the total government expenditures, the taxes 
levied by subnational governments only represented 18% of total government tax revenues (OECD, 2014, p. 197). 
36 National transfers represented 46% of the municipalities’ total income in 2013 (DNP, 2014a, p. 64) and 40.1% of 
the departments’ total income in 2013 (DNP, 2014a, p. 58). Additionally, around a quarter of the funds available for 
capital investments at the department level come from mineral royalties (DNP, 2014a).
37 National transfers include earmarked resources of the “general system of participations” (SGP), funding for social 
security pensions of teachers and other state employees, and other payments such as contributions to public universities 
(Echeverry, Navas and Clavijo, 2009). In 2006, the social security transfers and the SGP funds amounted to 44% and 
45% -respectively- of the total national government’s transfers to local governments (Echeverry, Navas and Clavijo, 
2009, p. 243). The constitution and the law strictly regulate the destination of SGP funds. Currently, the resources 
must be allocated to the following expenditures: 58.5% to education, 24.5% to health, 11.6% to potable water and 
basic sanitation, and only 5,4% for other purposes. Bonet, Gerson and Ayala (2014). In Colombia, most of the 
resources used to increase the scope and quality of public health and education come from the national government’s 
transfers to local governments (Galvis, 2014). In sum, local governments use national transfers to fund both current 
expenses (e.g. wages and social security) and investment expenses (e.g. investment projects to increase quality, scope 
and efficiency) particularly related to health, education and basic sanitation services.
38 Yet, the use of these resources is restricted to capital investments, not current expenditures.
39 See article 360 of the Constitution of 1991. “The royalty is the price that the owner of a natural resource charges for 
the right to develop the resource. … The royalty rate applied depends on the kind of product, and on the volume of 
the production.” (OECD, 2014, p. 95).
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these resources or their derivatives were transported. Hence, these “producing” munici-
palities and departments received “direct royalties” commensurate to oil, gas or mineral 
production while the rest of the municipalities where these commodities were transported 
received “indirect royalties”. Between 1995-2011 direct royalties represented – on average 
– 86% of total royalties (OECD, 2014, p. 103).40 Additionally, the destination of royal-
ties before the 2011 reform was heavily regulated and earmarked towards specific type of 
investments.41 
In July 2010 the Colombian government presented a constitutional amendment to 
modify the royalties system in Colombia and after one year of debate in Congress the 
reform was approved. The 2011 royalties’ reform (effective from January 2012 onwards) 
created the General System of Royalties (GRS) that included major changes in regards to 
resource allocation among local governments and the assessment, approval, and destina-
tion of investment projects funded by these resources.42 
The first key new rule of the GRS is that it decoupled the allocation of royalties from 
the geographic location and size of mineral and hydrocarbon production. The GRS es-
tablished five funds that benefit all municipalities and departments and left just one fund 
destined exclusively for “producing” regions, that from 2015 onwards represents only 
10% of the total royalty funds.43 
The two main consequences of the new resource allocation rules of the GRS were a 
steep reduction in the concentration of royalties’ distribution and a significant re-shuffle 
of resources among subnational governments. Firstly, as a result of the amendment, all the 
municipalities and departments in Colombia may benefit from royalty revenues. Thus, 
while around 42% of the municipalities did not have access to any royalties in 2011, 
89% of the municipalities accessed and started executing royalty resources in 2013.44 
40 Hence, in the 1990s and 2000s most of the royalties were allocated to a few resource-rich municipalities and 
departments, inhabited by approximately 14% of the Colombian population (Bonet and Urrego, 2014).
41 For example, for municipalities that received “direct royalties” had to destine 90% of the royalties to local investment 
projects “for environmental sanitation, potable water, sewage systems and other basic public services” (Armenta et al., 
2014, p. 15).
42 Before the reform, local governments accessed royalties almost directly and were subject to flexible rules in terms 
of the planning, procurement and implementation of investment projects. The reform created a complex system of 
funds and rules to access such funds. Particularly, each investment project requires the approval by a kind of board of 
directors integrated by subnational (mayors and governors) and national authorities (ministers of the cabinet or their 
representatives). 
43 The rest of the resource rents are allocated in the following funds: i) 10% for pension savings fund; ii) up to 30% for 
a savings and stabilization fund; iii) 10% for a science, technology and innovation fund; iv) after 2015, 24% for a 
regional compensation fund that allocates resources to the poorest municipalities and departments; and, v) after 2015, 
16% for a regional development fund that allocates resources to all subnational governments based on population and 
socio-economic variables.
44 Own calculations based on data from DNP (2014a). The fact that in 2012 and 2013 there were municipalities that 
did not execute royalties is due to their failure to obtain approval for specific investment projects, not because they lack 
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Secondly, the shift in resources also increased the resources available for certain regions 
and decreased the resources for a few regions, mainly those that produce hydrocarbons.45 
However, while the reform reduced significantly the concentration of resources allocat-
ed to the departments, the reduction in the concentration of resources allocated to the 
municipalities was small. Indeed, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index shifted from 1,472 
to 659 from the period 2010-11 to the period 2012-13 in regards to the departments’ 
resources, while the index shifted from 655 to 599 in the same periods in regards to the 
municipalities’ resources.46
Furthermore, the amendment shifted more resources to departments and consequent-
ly decreased the amount of resources available for individual municipalities.47 Hence, the 
resources executed by municipalities between the period 2010-11 and the period 2012-
13 increased in 22 percentage points while the resources executed by departments in the 
same periods increased in 48 percentage points.48 As a result, in the period 2012-2013 
departments accessed 62% of the total royalties while municipalities accessed 38%.49 Fur-
thermore, in 2013 the department investments funded with royalties presented a nine-
fold increase with respect the investments in 2012 (DGAP, 2014, p. 22). The shift of 
resources from municipalities to departments and the new system of prior approval of 
investment projects to access such resources may have changed the gravity of power at 
a subnational government level. In short, the new rules made municipalities and their 
mayors more dependent to the governors of their respective department to receive and 
execute royalty funds. 
The third key new set of rules included by the 2011 royalties’ reform is related to the 
destination of the royalties by municipalities and departments. In the GRS, the resources 
have to be used for investment purposes (hence, not current expenses), but are not ear-
marked for specific sectorial uses. Thus, the mayors and governors have more discretion 
than before to choose how to allocate the royalties.50 The autonomy for investing these 
a royalty funded budget. Up to date DGAP (2014) considers that the difficulties in budget execution by subnational 
governments are an important challenge for development. 
45 For example, the Department of Meta accessed 31% of the total royalties of the country in the period 2010-11, while 
in the period 2012-13 it only accessed 14% of total royalties. Own calculations based on data from DNP (2014a). 
46 Own calculations based on data from DNP (2014a). For the calculation of the HHI for municipalities I grouped the 
municipalities in their respective department. Hence, if I had calculated the HHI using the municipalities as the unit 
of measurement, the HHI would be considerably smaller. 
47 Colombia has 32 departments that aggregate a total 1102 municipalities and cities. Although for public accounting 
purposes, Bogota city is treated as a department, not as a city.
48 Own calculations based on data from DNP (2014a). 
49 Own calculations based on data from DNP (2014a).
50 This change may explain why the use of royalty resources has shifted from education, health and public services to 
other destinies. Indeed, up to date, according to DNP (2015) around 32.9% of the resources have been invested in 
transport projects, 14.3% in housing and urban infrastructure, 13.9% in education, 11.1% in science in technology, 
3.79% in health and social security services.
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resources is limited because each investment project requires technical approval by DNP 
and political approval from a collegiate body conformed by representatives from the three 
different tiers of the government called “Órganos Colegiados de Administración y Decisión 
– OCAD”. In this sort of “board of directors”, each tier of government (national, depart-
ment and municipal) has an equal voting right and decisions are taken by qualified major-
ity of voting (2 out of 3). Therefore, for example, if the representatives from the munici-
pal and department agree to approve a project, the national government cannot veto the 
decision. The OCAD’s assess, evaluate, prioritize, and approve the investment projects 
presented by the local governments (OECD, 2014).
4.  Risks and challenges of using resource revenues to finance post-
conflict needs
Juan Gossaín (Journalist): “From where are you going to 
raise the money for post conflict if dollar is at $2,600 
Colombian pesos and petroleum at USD $ 60 per barrel?”
Humberto de la Calle (Chief Colombian government 
negotiator for peace talks with Farc): “Farc should have 
signed the peace accord two or three years ago when 
petroleum was at USD 110.”51
Colombia is one of the Latin America’s countries that most benefitted from the last 
commodity price boom (Gómez-Sabaíni and Morán, 2014, p. 25). This cycle started 
around 2003 and reached its peak in mid 2008 when the prices dropped due to the global 
financial crisis. The growth trend resumed in 2009, and commodity prices remained high 
until 2011 (Altomonte et al., 2013; Gómez-Sabaíni and Morán, 2014). Yet, the prices of 
mineral and non-mineral commodities minerals started declining in 2011, and the prices 
of oil plummeted since June 2014.52 
51 ““Proceso de paz con Farc está en su peor momento”: Humberto de la Calle”, interview published by El Espectador on 
July 5, 2015. Retrieved on 09/07/2015:  http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/proceso-de-paz-farc-esta-su-
peor-momento-humberto-de-ca-articulo-570406 
52 The prices of oil halved between June 2014 and February 2014, but in the last months have partially recovered and are 
currently 43% below the prices of mid 2014.
236  REVISTA ANÁLISIS INTERNACIONAL•
Juan D. Gutiérrez-roDríGuez
The “super-cycle” seems to be over and the fiscal revenues from the exploitation of 
non-renewable resources have decreased substantially in oil exporting countries like Co-
lombia. The shortage of resource revenues has uncovered the limitations of the Colom-
bian tax system. As a result, the national government promoted a tax reform, approved 
by Congress in December 2014, among others, to cover the fiscal deficit generated by the 
drop in the prices of oil. Additionally, the government reduced its planned expenditures 
for 2015 by an amount equivalent to 0,7% of GDP. The cuts will affect central govern-
ment’s public investment, but seem to exclude “education and compensation of civil vic-
tims of the conflict” (IMF, 2015, p. 10).
Fedesarrollo estimated that if Colombia does not amend its tax system, the total gov-
ernment’s income would be reduced from 16.9% of GDP in 2013 to 13.8% of GDP in 
2020 (CEECT, 2015, p. 18). The fiscal challenge currently faced by the Colombian gov-
ernment is not limited to finding additional resources to deliver public goods, implement 
social programmes, and execute key investments in areas such as infrastructure, but also 
to raise additional funds for the post-conflict (CEECT, 2015, p. 7). 
Bearing in mind the above said, should the Colombian State rely on resource revenues 
to finance post-conflict needs? My answer to the question is quite straightforward: the 
Colombian State should not depend solely on resource revenues to finance post-conflict 
needs. Yet, I argue that this does not mean that resource rents should not be used for this 
purpose, or that these revenues should not have an important role in financing the post-
conflict’s expenditures. This section analyses the opportunities and the risks faced by the 
Colombian government if non-renewable natural resource rents, particularly from royal-
ties, are used to finance an eventual post-conflict process. 
4.1  Resource rents are a significant source of income but also volatile, decreasing 
and insufficient to finance post-conflict’s policies
Revenues from the extractive sector constitute a significant share of Colombian na-
tional and sub-national governments public income. Resource revenues from the extrac-
tive sector represented, on average, an annual income of approximately 3.5% of GDP for 
the Colombian State. Despite that these resources are a significant source of income that 
will very likely be required to finance the post-conflict, more and different sources of in-
come will be required. There are at least four reasons to justify this claim. 
First, the revenues from royalties are simply not sufficient to cover the expenditures 
required. As explained before, the Colombian public finances are already under signifi-
cant pressure due to the significant reduction of oil prices (OECD, 2015). According to 
Fedesarrollo, the fiscal income from the extractive sector “decreased from 3.5% of GDP 
in 2013 to 1.2% of GDP in 2015 and will be situated below 1% of GDP in the next 
years” (CEECT, 2015, p. 17). Furthermore, unless different technical, social, and envi-
11 • Vol. 6 No 1 • Enero-junio 2015 237
Investing for peace? On the use of resource revenues to finance an eventual post-conflict process in Colombia
ronmental related to the exploitation of oil by Ecopetrol issues are solved, a future decline 
in production is very likely (OECD, 2015, p. 17; MHCP, 2015, p. 21). Additionally, the 
production of the mining sector also contracted in 2014 for the first time in nine years 
(MHCP, 2015, p. 21).
Second, due to the GRS rules on the destination of royalties, less than two thirds of 
the funds would be available for investment for post-conflict purposes. The GRS consists 
of five funds that benefit all municipalities and departments and one fund destined exclu-
sively for “producing” regions. The rents from royalty payments are allocated in the fol-
lowing funds: i) 10% for pension savings fund; ii) up to 30% for a savings and stabiliza-
tion fund; iii) 10% for a science, technology and innovation fund; iv) after 2015, 24% for 
a regional compensation fund that allocates resources to the poorest municipalities and 
departments; v) after 2015, 16% for a regional development fund that allocates resources 
to all subnational governments based on population and socio-economic variables; and, 
vi) the direct royalties fund for producing regions that represented, from 2015 onwards, 
10% of total royalties.
Consequently, 40% of the royalty funds are earmarked for expenditures that cannot 
be used for post-conflict purposes, and 10% of the funds may be linked to post-conflict 
effort only if the projects are related to innovation. Thus, strictly speaking, only half of the 
royalties’ budget may be used directly to finance post-conflict policies. 
Moreover, the revenues from royalties can only be used for capital expenditures and 
only exceptionally for current expenditures such as formulating projects or initial opera-
tion of the project. Other sources of income are needed to finance the operation costs of 
schools or hospitals that may be built with royalties or to finance victims’ reparation. As a 
benchmark, to estimate the ratio between capital and current expenditures in the imple-
mentation of post-conflict projects, we can take into account the structure costs of ex-
penditures devoted to Colombian victims in the recent years. On average, between 2012-
2015, 39% of the budget destined for victims has been used in investment expenditures, 
25% in education and 21% in health, 9% in indemnification and 6% in other current 
expenditures (MHCP, 2015, p. 90).
However, even if the resource rents were currently sufficient to finance post-conflict 
policies, it would be very risk to rely on them for the future. There are two main reasons 
for the latter: volatility of public revenues due to the price cycle of commodities, and the 
future exhaustion of resources (Gómez-Sabaíni and Morán, 2014). Indeed, the prices of 
commodities, particularly oil, are more volatile than other goods traded in World markets 
(Sinnott et al., 2010; van der Ploeg, 2011; van der Ploeg and Venables, 2012).53
53 In 2012, “[o]il extraction generated 73% of royalty revenues an coal and gas generated 16% and 6% respectively” 
(OECD, 2014, p. 95).
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Finally, although Colombia has managed to increase its oil reserves in the last four 
years, its production has increased at a faster pace. Due the lower pace in the discovery of 
new oil fields and higher rate of production, the years of reserves fell for the first time in 
seven years (Ahumada, 2015). The following two graphs show these trends. 
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 In conclusion, resource rents are a significant source of income but also volatile, de-
creasing and insufficient to finance post-conflict’s policies. A more diversified basket of 
sources of income is required to ensure a steady and sufficient flow of resources for the 
long-term programmes that post-conflict requires.
4.2   The system for investing royalties allows tailoring region-specific post-conflict 
programmes, but the low implementation capacity curtails subnational 
governments’ autonomy
In repeated occasions both the national government representatives and Farc negotia-
tors have claimed that the implementation of the peace agreements, and in general the 
implementation of post-conflict policies, will require a territorial approach. The three 
Havana agreements constantly appeal to empowering the regions. It is likely that both 
municipal and department governments will be in charge of managing the bulk of the 
resources devoted to the post-conflict processes. 
Decentralization implies that decisions are taken at local level, closer to the citizens; 
consequently, in theory, local governments are expected to be more sensitive to prefer-
ences of citizens (Zapata, 2010). The work of Faguet (2012), that studied the effects of 
decentralization in Bolivia, shows that there are empirical grounds for greater responsive-
ness of subnational governments to local needs. 
Hence, the use of local governments’ own-income sources, such as royalty revenues, 
appears to be a good match for the necessity of a territorial implementation of post-con-
flict. Moreover, Colombian regions are very heterogeneous,54 highly unequal55 and have 
been exposed to the armed conflict in different degrees. Thus, the GRS may offer the flex-
ibility on the destination of the resources required to tailor the post-conflict programmes 
to the specific necessities of each region. 
However, the capacity of the Colombian local administrations to invest resource rents, 
on average, is very low.56 According to OECD, “[t]he evidence is that the system to 
manage royalty payments between 1994 and 2011 was not able to promote inclusive 
growth in Colombia’s resource-rich departments (2014, p. 97).” Indeed, there are at 
54 OECD describes Colombia as “a large country, whose topography, climate, regional accessibility, industrial 
specialisation, the legacy of the armed conflict and illegal activities, and also wide variations in sub-national 
governments’ capacities, have generated a ‘mega-diversity’ of regional economies” (2014, p. 11).
55 “Regional inequalities are not only 42 times higher than in Australia and more than 5 times higher than in Canada or 
the United States, but also higher than in most neighbouring Latin American countries” (OECD, 2014, p. 16).
56 According to OECD, “[w]ith some exceptions, many local and departmental governments lack the adequate technical, 
managerial and even political capacity to lead the [investment] development process. This is one of the main factors 
supressing the level of investment implemented in connection with the funds allocated by the new system of royalties, 
and also the quality of the territorial projects” (2014, p. 115).
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least a dozen studies concluding that the hydrocarbon and mineral booms in Colombia 
have had a sub-optimal effect at a subnational level, in terms of the impact of royalties 
on economic growth, poverty reduction, efficiency of public spending or provision of 
public goods (Benavides et al., 2000; Viloria, 2002; Sánchez, Mejía and Herrera, 2005; 
Candelo et al., 2008; MME, 2011; Armenta et al., 2012; Tamayo, 2012; EU and CNC, 
2012; Rojas, 2014; Moyano and Wright, 2015). Moreover, this lack of capacity to invest, 
particularly in small and remote municipalities, curtails local governments’ autonomy 
that is essential for post-conflict implementation (OECD, 2014).
The poor record on the investment of royalty revenues by municipalities and depart-
ments poses a big challenge for the future of local management of post-conflict pro-
grammes. Namely, the necessity to improve significantly the technical and political ca-
pacity of subnational governments to formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate public 
investments. In this vein, the National Development Plan for years 2014-2018 explic-
itly reckons the need of building the capacity of investment in local governments (DNP, 
2014b, p. 9). Additionally, it is necessary to increase transparency and accountability of 
local governments to curtail the high levels of corruption (OECD, 2014). 
In conclusion, the system for investing royalties gives space for territorial tailoring of 
post-conflict programmes, but low implementation capacity at the local level curtails sub-
national governments’ autonomy.
4.3  The transparency of resource rents investment has increased, but the process 
requires more citizen engagement
The agreements from the Havana peace processes underscore the importance of boost-
ing citizen participation in Colombia to strengthen democracy. Additionally, citizen par-
ticipation during different stages of public investment processes is key to ensure that gov-
ernments are responsive to local needs and to prevent corruption and mismanagement 
of resources. In this vein, the National Development Plan for years 2014-2018 and the 
three Havana agreements between the national government and the guerrilla, emphasize 
that post-conflict’s programmes require a territorial implementation with close citizen 
participation.
Are the investment processes of resource revenues in Colombia transparent and open 
to citizen participation? The availability of information about the processes and the in-
vestments certainly has improved in the recent years. Finding and accessing such infor-
mation before 2010 was a daunting task even for national government officials (Viloria, 
2002; Arisi and González, 2014). The information was highly dispersed and its accessi-
bility varied among different subnational governments. This situation changed when the 
Colombian national government decided to introduce transparency standards in its ex-
tractive sector, and prepare to apply for a candidacy to be part of the Extractive Industries 
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Transparency Initiative (EITI).57 EITI is just one of the different initiatives in the global 
drive towards greater transparency and accountability in the extractive industries (Arisi 
and González, 2014). 
In the last years the quality and quantity of information about the use of resource rev-
enues has increased substantially (Arisi and González, 2014). For example, since 2013 the 
information about royalty revenues received by each local government, the destination of 
the funds, the contractor selected to execute the project and the progress of implemen-
tation is publicly available through an internet platform managed by the National Plan-
ning Unit called Mapa de Regalías (Royalties Map).58 Colombia was accepted as candidate 
country for EITI in October 2014 and this commitment obliges the national government 
to be fully transparent on the revenues from oil, gas and mining activities (EITI, 2014). 
Moreover, complying the EITI standard also entails that the government must work with 
the business sector and civil society organisations to ensure an “informed debate” on the 
use of those resources, and to address other key issues such the environmental impacts of 
the extractive industries (EITI, 2014).
Moreover, in theory the multi-level bodies that assess and approve the investment 
projects formulated by local governments were designed as a “triangle of good governance 
whose purpose is to prevent fraud and improve efficiency and effectiveness in the use of 
resources” (Arisi and González, 2014, p. 283). The OCAD’s decision-making meetings 
may include the participation of “committees of consult” that are composed by repre-
sentatives from civil society groups, business associations, may audit the OCAD’s and 
ethnic groups, among other stakeholders. Additionally, Arisi and González (2014) report 
that diverse actors from the civil society have been recently empowered at the local level 
to oversight the investment processes of resource rents. The mechanisms that empower 
the citizen participation, such as accountability hearings on the management of resource 
rents may “open windows of opportunity” for dialogue for greater accountability (Arisi 
and González, 2014). 
Yet, although there are some specific initiatives of civil society groups, extractive sector 
companies and associations and NGOs to participate closely in the oversight of royalty 
funds investments at the local level, citizen participation is not a common feature in most 
of the regions. Due to the centralization legacy and the armed conflict “many peripheral 
areas do not have the civic associations and groups that would allow civil society to 
assist in the [projects’] development process” (OECD, 2014, p. 115). Hence, the SGR 
57 The EITI define itself as “a global Standard to promote open and accountable management of natural resources. It 
seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform public debate, and enhance trust. In each implementing 
country it is supported by a coalition of governments, companies and civil society working together.” See information 
on EITI here:  https://eiti.org/eiti. 
58 The Royalties Map can be accessed here:  http://maparegalias.sgr.gov.co.
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processes require to be upgraded with “an extensive consultation process involving sub-
national entities, business and citizen organisations” (OECD, 2014, p. 115). 
 Finally, increasing citizen’s participation to make governments more accountable for 
their management of public resources requires avoiding the rentier-state type of incentives 
generated by natural resource revenues. This notion, first developed in the early 1970s by 
scholars that studied oil-rich Middle-East countries, contended: “when governments gain 
most of their revenues from external sources, such as resource rents or foreign assistance, 
they are freed from the need to levy domestic taxes and become less accountable to the 
societies they govern” (Ross, 1999, p. 312). In this vein, Karl (1997, p. 16) argued that 
fiscal dependence on oil revenues eventually led to a rentier-state that is eager to spend 
without having the capacity to invest, that “encourages the political distribution of rents”, 
and where “officials become habituated to relying on the progressive substitution of pub-
lic spending for statecraft, thereby further weakening state capacity.” 
How to avoid rentier-state incentives? Besides devising mechanisms to make citizen 
participation more effective in the investment processes of resource rents, the straightfor-
ward way is diversifying the sources of public income and strengthening the tax sources 
over resource rents. 
In conclusion, the transparency of resource rents investment has increased, but the 
management of these resources requires more citizen engagement to make local govern-
ments accountable.
4.4  Criminal groups may target point-source revenues, increasing the probability 
of relapsing in an armed conflict
The Colombian extractive sector has been closely related to the armed conflict. Many 
of the conflict zones coincide with the presence of non-renewable resources (Massé, 
2012). Furthermore, the presence of extractive companies in these regions made them a 
political and economic target for armed groups. There are multiple cases in which these 
groups financed by extorting these companies, and there are also allegations of compa-
nies voluntarily financing these groups in exchange of “services”, particularly paramilitary 
groups (Dube and Vargas, 2006, 2013; Massé, 2012, 2013). 
Different econometric studies have shown a positive relation between the amount of 
royalties in municipalities and the incidence of the armed conflict. Sánchez and Palau 
(2006, p. 29) found evidence according to which “the presence of local resources such 
as royalties and taxes triggers violence against politicians.” Moreover, Dube and Vargas 
(2006, 2013) found a direct and significant correlation between oil price (positive) shocks 
and the number of paramilitary attacks in municipalities (e.g. political kidnappings or 
massacres) where crude is produced and/or transported. 
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Moreover, Dube and Vargas interpreted “that a rise in petrol prices motivates armed 
groups to escalate activity in oil-rich areas, with the aim of extracting these resources” 
(2013, p. 1406). They argued that increased prices made oil-rich municipalities more 
attractive for armed groups; this is the particular case of paramilitary groups that “have 
operated disproportionately in oil areas and used explicit strategies to intervene in elec-
tions” (Carreri and Dube, 2014, p. 10). According to Carreri and Dube (2014), armed 
groups had incentives to intervene in elections in order to install mayors that would give 
them access to resource revenues, for example through the allocation of public contracts. 
Finally, Carreri and Dube (2014) argued that their econometric evidence showed how the 
prices of oil had influenced the electoral outcome in Colombian municipalities. Using 
data on oil price shocks, Carreri and Dube concluded: 
Exploiting oil price shocks, we found that increases in oil value lead to the in-
creased election of legislators affiliated with right-wing pro-paramilitary parties in 
more oil dependent municipalities. We document that these effects are larger in 
conflict locations, and correspond to the increased presence of armed groups in oil 
rich regions. We also found that these price shocks reduce electoral competition, as 
reflected in fewer candidates running for office and higher vote margins of winners. 
Our results suggest that where armed groups predate on natural resources, and 
are positioned to intervene in elections forcefully, resource rents will undermine in-
stitutions as these groups act to constrict political participation. As such, the com-
bined effect of conflict and the presence of natural resources may prove particularly 
inimical to local democracy.  (2014, p. 20).
Both guerrilla and paramilitary groups have found different ways of benefitting from 
royalty revenues. According to Sánchez and Palau (2006, p. 34) the management of pub-
lic funds at the local level has been restrained “by pressure of armed groups and ‘armed 
clientelism’ (using violence to appropriate State resources).” Revenue predation is shaped 
in different forms but occurred either as a consequence of extortion or through collusion 
with local politicians (Dube and Vargas, 2006, 2013; Massé, 2012, 2013; Carreri and 
Dube, 2014). 
There were cases where armed groups pressured local governments on how to use roy-
alties and as well as cases of local governments co-opted by armed groups that deviated 
royalties and other sources of public income to finance armed activities (Viloria, 2002; 
Dube and Vargas, 2006, 2013; Massé, 2012, 2013; Arisi and González, 2014; Carreri and 
Dube, 2014). There are reports of such situations in petroleum regions (Dube and Var-
gas, 2006, 2013; Massé, 2012, 2013), gold mining regions (Massé, 2012; Franco, 2013), 
nickel mining regions (EU and CNC, 2012), and coal mining regions (Sánchez, Mejía 
and Herrera, 2005; Gutiérrez and Celis, 2014).
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This problem was not merely an issue of criminal enforcement, since the illegal appro-
priation of resource revenues by armed groups was the result of their political strategy too. 
As explained by Massé (2013), for example, in crude producing regions paramilitary and 
neo-paramilitary groups financed politicians’ electoral campaigns, and then the elected 
politicians paid back through the award of contracts financed by royalties.
In conclusion, criminal groups may target point-source revenues, increasing the prob-
ability of relapsing in an armed conflict. Consequently, preventing the illegal appropria-
tion of revenues from royalties by criminal organizations in the post-conflict will certainly 
be a very big challenge for the Colombian State. However, it is worth mentioning that 
Massé (2013) reported that the new GRS system might have reduced the illegal groups 
capacity to appropriate the revenues from royalties. 
5.  Conclusions
This paper aimed to discuss the risks and opportunities of using non-renewable natu-
ral resource rents, particularly from royalties, to finance post-conflict policies and pro-
grammes. I argued that resource rents may play an important role in financing the post-
conflict’s expenditures, but that such use has some pitfalls that the national and subna-
tional governments must tackle. 
Additionally, in the previous section, I presented four main conclusions about the use 
of resource rents to finance the policies required in a post-conflict:
1. Resource rents are a significant source of income but also volatile, decreasing and 
insufficient to finance post-conflict’s policies.
2. The system for investing royalties gives a margin for tailoring post-conflict pro-
grammes for each region, but low investment capacity of level subnational gov-
ernments reduces their autonomy to design and implement these programmes.
3. The transparency of resource rents investment has increased, but the process re-
quires more citizen engagement to make local governments accountable.
4. Criminal groups may target point-source revenues, increasing the probability of 
relapsing in an armed conflict.
Hence, it is necessary to consider a more diversified basket of sources of income to 
hedge against income volatility and to ensure the continuous flow of resources required 
for the long-term maintenance of post-conflict programmes.59 The question of how to 
59 The challenge of diversifying is certainly not exclusive of Colombia, but of most of the Latin America’s resource rich 
countries. In this sense, Gómez-Sabaíni and Morán (2014, p. 75) suggest that tax reform proposals should aim, among 
others, to “[r]educe income volatility and dependence on income from natural resource exploitation in countries that 
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raise resources for post-conflict is not very different from the more general issue of how to 
mobilize additional resources for the operation and investments of the Colombian State. 
This broader question goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the additional post-conflict sources of income 
suggested in the past by IMF (Aninat, 2002), such as privatisations and foreign aid, seem 
to be less feasible now a days.60 The investments required for peace building in Colombia 
will require increasing tax revenues at the domestic level. As claimed recently by Ibáñez 
(2015), if Colombians want to benefit from peace in the long-term, the payment of ad-
ditional taxes almost everyone will be unavoidable.
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